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VERACIOUS VERDICTS: AN EXPANSION OF COGNITIVE-EXPERIENTIAL 
SELF-THEORY IN JURY DECISION-MAKING USING ATTRIBUTION THEORY 
JADE E. LARSON 
2021 
As a pillar in our judicial system, the courts utilize almost ten million citizens 
each year for jury service. As a result, the courts are faced with issues of inconsistency 
and unpredictability. This study aims to examine some factors that significantly influence 
jury decision-making by investigating cognitive experiential self-theory (CEST) as a jury 
decision-making model, unified with attribution theory to better predict verdict outcomes. 
An online survey was distributed to 121 participants. The respondents were asked to read 
a civil trial case presentation; they were then randomly divided into two conditions (high 
and low unrelated detail eyewitness testimony). The testimonies had the same relevant 
information with a single sentence difference regarding the character of the witness. 
Finally, participants were asked to come to a verdict deciding guilt, liability, and 
monetary award. Analysis of the responses further confirmed CEST as a jury decision-
making model. Participants who received the high unrelated detail eyewitness testimony 
were more likely to find the defendant not guilty. Analysis also showed participants with 
a stronger sense of external locus of control, those who rely on powerful others and 
chance, attributed higher liability to the defendant. The results indicate that irrelevant 
factors do have an impact on jury decision-making. Also, the individual difference and 
message factors have meaningful theoretical implications, as well as applicable jury 




Twelve people, one verdict, and copious amounts of research have yet to explain 
the reason why attorneys present sound, logical evidence and still lose the case. Citizens 
called to jury service fulfill their civic engagement duties (Cooper et al., 2006). Jury 
service is among the highest forms of power in a democracy granted by the founders to 
civilians, which is essential to promote fairness and education in the justice system 
(Justice & Meares, 2014). Previous research highlights that jury decision-making is 
important, but at times unpredictable. There are conflicting perceptions on the best 
information processing model for jury decision-making and, consequentially, questions 
of the quality of verdicts because of a variety of influential factors impacting jury verdict 
decisions of a case. The research here aims to determine how varying factors impact jury 
decision-making using the cognitive experiential model (Epstein, 1994). This chapter 
introduces the research by explaining the problem with the lack of cohesiveness in jury 
decision-making research, the background, the research objective, scope, and significance 
of studying those influential factors. 
Almost ten million citizens report for jury service annually to courthouses across 
the country (Bose, Pal, & Sappington, 2019). Jury service, as a staple of the American 
court system will continuously call on citizens to make difficult decisions. Jury decision-
making prediction strategies create effective efforts to understand verdict outcomes. Yet 
this system requires more research to accurately prepare, predict, and prosecute ethically 
in both criminal and civil courtrooms. Extensive jury decision-making research has yet to 




study is to gain a fuller understanding of the jury decision-making complexities, along 
with how the court system, attorneys, and involved parties can better predict verdict 
outcomes. Furthermore, studying jury decision-making through a communicative 
perspective can better equip attorneys during trial and witness preparation. To gain a 
better and deeper understanding of external influences, in-depth quantitative research is 
required. By focusing on the individual juror’s information processing and loci of control, 
research can help develop a more unified theoretical framework, provide courtroom 
communication strategies, and aid attorneys and professionals in preparation and 
prediction.  
Background of the Problem 
Extant research incorporates a variety of decision-making models driving studies 
of jury decision-making. The varying use of different jury decision-making models has 
led to inconsistencies in the literature. Polavin (2019) researched the importance of a 
more consistent and better jury decision-making model to help make accurate predictions 
about jury decisions and aid trial preparation for attorneys in court. He articulated the 
difference between relevant and irrelevant factors that influence jury decision-making. 
Relevant factors of a case are the evidence, and facts of the case should be the only 
factors in decision-making (Lieberman, 2002). However, irrelevant facts, such as 
physical appearances, emotions, and member status, also influence decision-making. 
When proposing his preferred jury decision-making model, Polavin (2019) compared the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) in contrast to Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory 
(CEST) as jury decision making models. ELM has two routes to persuasion: (1) central 




elaboration aspects of the argument that the juror would have low motivation and ability 
to make judgments from (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The first route, or the central route, 
requires high elaboration focused on the merits of the argument itself, such as case 
evidence, data, and facts. The second route, or peripheral route, requires low elaboration 
to process details such as physical attributes, race, or gender.  Thus, low levels of 
elaboration, not thoroughly processing information, result in the jury making judgments 
about the irrelevant factors of the case.  
Similar to ELM, CEST is a dual-process model that includes two systems people 
use to make sense of the world. First, rooted in logic and evidence, the rational system is 
a slow analytical process. Second, in contrast, the experiential system is a quick and 
intuitive process that uses previous experiences to make decisions (Epstein, 1994). 
Polavin (2019) argues that CEST is a better decision-making model than ELM because 
irrelevant information such as physical attractiveness (Efran, 1974), socio-economic 
status (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994), gender, emotional cues, prior experiences 
(Lieberman, 2002), and pretrial publicity (Lieberman & Arndt, 2000) have all been 
shown to influence the verdicts even when juries are thoroughly processing information. 
Jurors use the rational system to process the case’s relevant factors, whereas irrelevant 
factors of the case process in the experiential system. Although jurors should make an 
effort to use the rational system to analyze the facts and evidence of the case, when using 
the experiential system to make the decisions, they are more susceptible to biases. CEST 
dual processes’ ability for co-occurrence between the rational and experience system 
provides uniqueness to studying jury decision-making with this model to help overcome 




processing, strategies used to communicate with jurors can be refined utilizing CEST as a 
jury decision-making model. 
CEST’s dual-processing information systems explain how jurors can use effortful 
cognitive ability yet have irrelevant factors that still influence decisions, whereas ELM 
only accounts for irrelevant influences when jurors have low motivation or ability 
(Polavin, 2019). Polavin’s study (2019) adds support to CEST as a jury decision-making 
model by predicting the type of information jurors will consider, the influence from that 
information, and if they will be able to change decisions with new information. For these 
reasons, I propose using CEST as the information processing theoretical framework for 
this research. Polavin (2019) suggested future researchers implement methodological 
changes to the type of information, adjust predictor variables in the narratives, and further 
increase the strength of the manipulation. These suggestions led me to use the bona fide 
group perspective as a methodological framework and attribution theory as an additional 
theoretical framework. To get further insight into Bona Fide Group Perspective, 
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory, and Attribution Theory, I will now introduce the 
significance of these theories in jury decision-making. 
Bona Fide Group Perspective 
Juries can be studied using the bona fide group perspective. Bona fide groups 
naturally form in the real world and are studied by using the groups’ communication 
process, negotiated group boundaries, and a group’s external and internal environmental 
and contextual factors (Putnam, 1994). The two criteria for bona fide groups, permeable 
boundaries and interdependence with the context, are met by juries. Jurors individually 




process. The contextual factors members draw up from external groups create permeable 
boundaries (Putnam & Stohl, 1990; Sunwolf & Seidbold 1998). As jury members fulfill 
their civic duties through jury duty, they create a reciprocal interdependence with the 
context. Through formal and informal communication, jury members communicate with 
internal group members and external groups outside of the jury, linking their boundaries, 
environments, and other contextual factors (Sunwolf & Seibold, 1998). The bona fide 
group perspective helps us examine the influence of external factors, such as multigroup 
commitments, on juror communication. In this study, bona fide group perspective 
provides context about jurors as a small group.  
Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory 
 Jury decision-making depends on several influences, aside from the facts and 
evidence of the case, such as irrelevant factors from group communication, including 
context, internal and external locus of control, cognitive bias, emotions, past experiences, 
and many more (Lieberman, 2002). The experiential system guides behavior by encoding 
previous outcomes, guiding decisions with emotions and intuition through associations 
when we have experienced a similar situation (Epstein, 2014; Sladek et al., 2010). 
Alternatively, the rational system’s conscious assessment of events and stimuli within the 
environment guides behavior by making intentional decisions (Epstein, 2014; Sladek et 
al., 2010). When processing information, jurors can be inducted into transportation or 
identification during the narrative case presentation. Transportation occurs when jurors 
process information at high rational and high experiential processing; all mental systems 
focus on events occurring in the narrative, bringing audiences into the story (Green & 




defendant. Communication research of narratives investigates not only transportation into 
a narrative story but also identification with the characters within the story (Green, 2002). 
Identification is a communication strategy for persuasion to influence attitude changes 
toward a character’s actions (Graaf et al., 2012). CEST provides a model to explain the 
influence of both irrelevant and relevant factors presented to the jurors.   
The present study uses CEST in conjunction with bona fide group perspective to 
help both researchers and attorneys understand jury members’ outside group 
commitment(s) and their influence on decision-making. CEST paired with attribution 
theory may help us understand emotional influence on verdicts and predict which of the 
jurors are likely influenced and persuaded. By understanding how the two systems, 
rational and experiential, interact with attribution theory, we can use CEST as a model to 
understand jury decision-making and make predictions about possible biases when the 
experiential system is used. 
Attribution Theory 
Jurors use internal and external factors to make attributions. Attribution theory 
begins with a behavior, event, or condition that individuals use to make specific 
attributions about how that outcome was attained (Heider, 1958; Weiner 1974, 1986, 
1995). Jurors make inferences about those involved in the case from their personal 
internal and external loci of control. Locus of control is a concept used to explain how 
outcomes are based on the individual’s belief of their control over different experiences 
and situations that impact their lives (Rotter, 1966).  Jurors’ loci of control dictate their 
perception of the defendants or victims and impact how they attribute the behaviors 




personal decisions and efforts guide their behavior. In contrast, individuals with an 
external locus of control rely on chance and powerful others to guide their behaviors 
(Ajzen, 2002).  
Individuals will sometimes underestimate the situational (external) factors and 
overestimate dispositional (internal) factors to fill causal gaps in the story to explain 
human behavior. Jurors who overestimate dispositional factors make a fundamental 
attribution error, creating biases in the decision-making process, possibly leading to 
incorrect verdicts (Shtudiner et al., 2017). Jurors, considering the bona fide group 
perspective, are influenced by their external group membership(s) and other external 
factors, which may lead to a fundamental attribution error if they overestimate internal 
factors to explain the defendant and plaintiff victim behavior. Therefore, the study is to 
better understand the relationship between the impact of the communication used within a 
trial and loci of control. For these reasons, this research uses attribution theory, 
fundamental attribution error, and bona fide group perspective in conjunction with CEST 
to better understand and possibly predict jury decision-making. 
This research aims to provide an explanation of the jury decision-making process 
by using the central themes of several theories and concepts to explain under what 
circumstances verdict outcomes are affected. Slater and Gleason (2012) provide 
strategies to further communication theory by utilizing centralized themes within theory. 
In this study, utilizing an alternative operation for CEST and attribution theory by 
analyzing their relationship together may aid in conceptualizing these theorized relations. 




(2019) study by adding independent variables relevant to attribution theory and 
identification through messaging.  
The communication discipline has room to expand jury decision-making research 
by providing insight into communication strategies that impact jury information 
processing. Jury decision-making is vital for civilian power in a democracy and for 
attorney performance. Many jury decision-making models have been utilized for jury 
research, and CEST has a significant relationship with the jury decision-making process. 
Yet it is unclear the strength of irrelevant factors has on CEST and the jury decision-
making process. Therefore, I propose analyzing high unrelated detail eyewitness 
testimony in civil trials. This research aims to determine how external factors influence 
jurors’ verdict outcomes. Thus, this study is to better understand the communicative 
challenges and strengths in the courtroom. 
In review, this chapter introduced the importance of understanding jury decision-
making, two models used, and the addition of attribution theory as well as bona fide 
group perspective. This study aims to add to the body of knowledge about jury decision-
making by considering the impact of juror’s emotions and stress as they reach a verdict. It 
fills an existing gap by understanding the cognitive biases that influence information 
processing and open doors for further research into jury decision-making. Additionally, 
by understanding the juror's locus of control, attorneys can better predict how jury 
members will process different types of information. To investigate this, chapter two 
includes a literature review of a variety of theoretical approaches to jury decision-
making. Chapter three includes the methodology to study the interaction of these theories. 











Review of Literature  
Communication scholars have not fully investigated the role of communication 
within the courtroom, aside from jury deliberation. Thus, the purpose of this study is to 
better understand the role of communication and information processing during a civil 
trial. Furthermore, this study investigates the influential factors impacting jury decision-
making. This study uses Bona Fide Group Perspective to better understand the impact of 
various external factors; this study also uses Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory and 
Attribution Theory to analyze how information processing and locus of control affect 
verdict outcomes. 
This review of literature examines Bona Fide Group Perspective, Cognitive-
Experiential Self-Theory, and Attribution Theory. While a great deal of research has been 
conducted on these theories, little research has synthesized these theories to understand 
the impact they have on jury decision-making. The historical background and importance 
of the theories are discussed below, as well as jury decision-making implications 
extending from the use of these theoretical frameworks. Prior to the explanation of the 
proposed methodology in chapter three, this chapter will provide insight into the 
extensive background of literature that investigates the problem and informs my 
hypotheses and research questions. 
Bona Fide Group Perspective 
Before the 1980s and early 1990s, research by small group communication 
scholars focused on artificial problems in small groups made in a laboratory rather than 




(1990) called for a change in the conceptualization of small group communication and 
began conducting early research of the bona fide group perspective by studying small 
groups of people in their most natural form. However, the bona fide group perspective is 
more than a call for studying groups in natural settings. The bona fide group perspective 
considers the communication process, negotiated group boundaries, and a group’s 
external and internal environmental and contextual factors (Putnam, 1994). While 
studying small groups through this lens, Putnam and Stohl (1990) established two criteria 
that led them to the classification of the bona fide group perspective. The first criterion is 
stable but permeable boundaries. The bona fide group perspective boundaries are socially 
constructed boundaries that separate and link groups to a multitude of contexts. The 
second criterion is interdependence with the immediate context. Groups develop a 
reciprocal relationship with the environment that influences individual behavior (Putnam 
& Stohl, 1990). Bona fide group perspective focuses on the influences of a multitude of 
contextual factors that impact small group communication. 
Stable yet permeable boundaries 
 The first characteristic that classifies a bona fide group is stable but permeable 
boundaries negotiated by the group members. These boundaries are fluid and dynamic, 
specifically linking the group members to their internal group dynamics and external 
influences (Putnam & Stohl, 1990). Group membership must have a clear identity within 
the cultural setting while also having the freedom to change while the boundaries stay 
intact. 
Group members negotiate boundaries in four ways: (1) multiple group 




membership, and (4) group identity formation (Putnam & Stohl, 1996). Group boundaries 
are permeable when members of one group are also members of other groups. Multiple 
group memberships equip individuals with experiences that may cause role identity 
conflict because of race, gender, religion, and occupancy (Putnam & Stohl, 1996). 
Multiple group memberships impact members’ behavior, interpretation of the task in a 
given group, and interactions with other group members. Within the second element of 
negotiable boundaries, group members’ act as representatives by becoming the link 
between the multigroup memberships. The group members become representatives for 
the outside groups they have commitments with. The third factor of permeable 
boundaries is group fluctuation. New members joining a group force the existing group 
members to build a new set of connections. Finally, permeable boundaries influences 
come from group identity. Groups can adapt to changes creating permeability, but groups 
must keep coherence amongst group members for stability to maintain goals and task 
completion (Putnam & Stohl, 1996). 
Interdependent with the context 
 The second characteristic of a bona fide group is the interdependence with the 
immediate context, which centralizes around how groups depend on the surrounding 
environment. As Putnam and Stohl (1990) stated in their original article, “Context, then, 
is not simply a set of variables that impinges on the groups; rather it is embedded in the 
interactions of members since each message references and negotiates the degree of 
interdependence among internal and external groups” (p. 259). The group’s context, the 
amount of interdependence, and the group’s environment are foundational components of 




is the “intergroup system or the environment within which the members situate 
themselves” (p. 286). Groups are interdependent on information and communication from 
within and in the surrounding environment, potentially influencing group interactions. 
Group interdependence with the immediate context is rooted in communication. 
Putnam (1996) highlighted four key characteristics of connectivity and interdependence: 
(1) intergroup communication, (2) negotiation of jurisdiction and autonomy, (3) 
coordinated action among groups, and (4) interpretive frames. Groups are embedded in 
external factors such as organizational, political, social, and other environments that 
impact communication within the groups (Putnam & Stohl, 1996). Intergroup 
communication refers to the connectivity of group members and external factors that 
shape group norms and rules. External contextual factors also impact the negotiation of 
jurisdiction and, more specifically, the autonomy of a group (Putnam, 1996). 
Communication gives the group opportunities to negotiate contextual factors such as: 
who they are, what they stand for, and how they view the world (Beck et al., 1998). 
Coordinated actions between groups heavily rely on external authority, which impacts the 
task. Lastly, interpretive frames focus attention on group communication. Group 
members build narratives from evidence and connect decision outcomes to their 
interpretation of the task (Putnam, 1996). Contextual factors, internally and externally, 
influence group communication and decision outcomes. Sunwolf and Seidbold (1998) 
suggest jurors use formal and informal channels of communication to negotiate, 
suggesting interdependence with a variety of contexts. 




Putnam and Stohl (1990) called for the revitalization of small group theory and 
bona fide group perspective to bring small group research to the real world. The two 
characteristics define bona fide groups by stable but permeable boundaries and the 
interdependence of context (Putnam & Stohl 1990, 1996). The bona fide group 
perspective has been used as a methodological justification for studying the complexity 
of groups and their context, while other researchers have used the perspective to explain 
how natural groups form related to their context (Beck et al., 2016) The two key 
characteristics of the bona fide group perspective apply to the study of juries and the 
internal and external contextual factors of a small group. Drawing from diverse corners of 
the nation in conjunction with internal jury identity impact the dynamic of the small 
group. The makeup of juries is unpredictable due to the vast differences of internal 
identity each member brings to the group; however bona fide group perspective offers an 
explanation of the impact of internal contextual factors, such as identity. 
Juries can be classified as bona fide groups (Sunwolf & Seibold, 1998). The 
personal, professional, and systemic experiences individuals contribute to juries offer vast 
complexities. Sunwolf and Seidbold (1998) discussed jurors as “significant social entities 
drawn from diverse sections of society, each with rules and practices for group decision-
making they must jointly enact” (p. 286). Juror’s multigroup membership brings a diverse 
perspective but can impact role identity and conflict. Jury members are also 
representatives between the jury and a number of external groups (Sunwolf & Seibold, 
1998). As bona fide group members, the jurors can provide contextual information from 
the external groups. This idea inevitably creates a permeable boundary, fulfilling the first 




methodological justification by studying the complexity of the group member’s 
individual identity as well as the external factors that influence group member 
communication, such as considering their commitments to other groups. 
Citizens are called to jury service to fulfill their civic engagement duties (Cooper 
et al., 2006), creating reciprocal interdependence between the group and the 
environmental context. Juries rely on both formal and informal communication with 
internal group members and external groups outside of the jury, linking their boundaries, 
environments, and other contextual factors (Sunwolf & Seibold, 1998). Observing jury 
decision-making through a bona fide perspective gives us the opportunity to study the 
external contextual factors that influence jury members’ communication. This research 
requires us to look at each juror individually; however, bona fide group perspective offers 
context to jurors that could impact the verdict outcome. Before researchers can make 
proper inferences about group decisions, understanding individual information processing 
is pertinent. Cognitive-experiential self-theory offers insight into juror’s decision-making 
process. 
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory 
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) categorizes information into two 
systems through which we make sense of the world, creating a dual-process model 
(Epstein, 1994). Individuals automatically make an unconscious personal theory of reality 
self-theory, world-theory, and connecting judgments (Epstein et al., 1992). This dual-
process model is comprised of rational and experiential systems. The rational system 
processes evidence and logic. In contrast, the second system of CEST is the experiential 




1994). Epstein’s (1994) combination of both systems, rational and experiential, created a 
unified framework for understanding information processing in decision-making. 
Although these two processes are dramatically different, under most circumstances, they 
work best together (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Individuals use both systems simultaneously 
to interpret behaviors and make all of one’s decisions. 
Rational processing requires large amounts of cognitive resources, making the 
process slow and analytical operating at the conscious level. The process is intentional, 
affect-free, and reason-orientated (Epstein 1994; Epstein et al., 1996). Rational 
processing requires logic and evidence to justify decision-making (Epstein, 1994). In 
contrast, the experiential system is intuitive and adaptive to allow individuals to learn 
from experiences (Epstein, 1994).  
The experiential system encompasses people’s personal theories of reality and 
operates according to principles that are automatic, holistic, and affective (Epstein et al., 
1996). The experiential system is a less effortful processing system serving as the default 
mode and it is used most of the time (Lieberman, 2002). The experiential system guides 
behavior by encoding previous outcomes. Outcomes guide decisions with emotions and 
intuition through associations that manifest in an emotional gut feeling when we have 
experienced a similar situation (Epstein, 2014; Sladek et al., 2010). Alternatively, the 
rational system’s conscious assessment uses slow, effortful appraisal of events and 
stimuli within the environment to guide behavior by making intentional decisions 
(Epstein, 2014; Sladek et al., 2010). Both systems provide an explanation for information 
processing and decision-making. 




Decision-making, according to CEST, guided by the rational and experiential 
systems, is influenced by the situation and emotional implications (Denes-raj & Epstein, 
1994). If the situational factors remain constant, and the emotional implications increase, 
there will be a shift from the rational to the experiential system (Denes-raj & Epstein, 
1994). Denes-raj and Epstein (1994) conducted a study to understand the interaction 
between the rational and experiential system. The participants in the study were directed 
to choose between two bowls of jellybeans. One bowl had ten white beans and one red, 
whereas the other bowl had 100 white and between five and nine red beans. The 
participants were presented with the probability of picking the red bean out of both 
bowls. The bowl with only ten white beans had a higher probability of drawing the one 
red bean, whereas the bowl with 100 white beans and between five and nine red beans 
had a lower probability. Two groups of win and lose trials were made. The win trial could 
win one dollar but not lose, whereas the lose trial could lose their one dollar but not win. 
Positive effects increase the use of the experiential system, resulting in subjects relying 
on intuition; thus, the researchers hypothesized that there would be fewer positive effects 
on the lose trials making them more likely to use rational processing. In contrast, the win 
trials would be following their intuition and use the experiential system, and thus would 
choose more nonoptimal choices. 
Denes-raj and Epstein (1994) reported a majority of subjects in both win and lose 
trials made nonoptimal choices in relation to the probability of winning by picking the 
larger bowl that had a smaller probability of picking a red bean. The subjects reported 
that they chose the larger bowl with more red beans because it looked like there were 




(Denes-raj & Epstein, 1994). This study is an example of the two systems conflicting and 
the experimental system overriding the rational system. The subjects relied on their 
intuition from the experiential system and their emotions, resulting in making nonoptimal 
choices. In a similar study, Epstein and Pacini (2001) asked the subjects if they would 
pick the higher or lower probability gamble and what a “rational person” would pick. The 
answers supported the study when the participants said the rational person would pick the 
best answer while they picked the nonoptimal answer. Both of these studies show the 
interaction between the experiential system and the rational system, specifically the 
experiential system overriding the rational process. 
The two systems interact with one another; however, they can both be active at 
high levels (Epstein, 1994). It is expected to only be able to experience high rational or 
high experiential processing one at a time, but in fact, they can both be active at high 
levels at the same time.  Polavin (2019) discussed this important component of CEST that 
is particularly applicable to jury decision-making. His study found that the high activity 
of both systems adds another aspect to study CEST outside of the experiential only and 
rational only conditions. Epstein (1994) found that the high activity of both processes can 
still lead to bias decision-making unless individuals possess the ability to override their 
intuition. In the real world, individuals do not process information solely from the 
rational-only and experiential-only conditions. Exposure to conflicting manipulations 
influences both systems and inevitably leads to high rational and high experiential 
processes co-occurring. CEST attributes heuristics (biases) to the normal mode of 




rational processing as an alternative organized conceptual system influencing one 
another’s operation. (Epstein, 2003).   
The experiential system is automatic and intuitive, which can cause cognitive 
biases within the dual processing model. Heuristics are mental shortcuts that reduce the 
complexity of a task, often resulting in cognitive biases. Individuals intuitively, 
sometimes rationally, use heuristics to make judgments and quick decisions, which can 
result in cognitive biases being made during the mental shortcuts (Epstein et al., 2002; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Although both systems are prone to bias, the experiential 
system independently is claimed as biased because irrelevant factors such as physical 
attractiveness (Efran, 1974), socio-economic status (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994), gender, 
emotional cues, prior experiences (Lieberman, 2002), and pretrial publicity (Lieberman 
& Arndt, 2000), affect this system (Epstein, 2014). The experiential system is led by 
intuition but can still be overridden by rational processing. An individual’s ability to 
override their intuition and rationally processes information leads to less cognitive bias. 
The ability to override an intuition and reach the correct conclusion with rational 
thought can be measured by the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). Fredrick (2005) asked 
subjects a question that most answer quick and intuitively, but only those who override 
their intuition reach the correct answer (e.g., a bat and ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat 
costs one dollar more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?). The answer to the 
CRT question is five cents. Many will reply with an answer of ten cents, which is 
incorrect. If the bat costs $1.00 more than the ball and the total is $1.10, then the ball 
must cost five cents and the bat must cost $1.05. If the ball were to cost ten cents, then 




ability to use the rational system to override the initial intuition from the experiential 
system, thus connecting CRT to CEST (Toplak et al., 2011). CRT, in this study, will 
measure jurors’ ability to override their intuition. 
Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory and Jury Decision-Making 
Narratives 
 As a persuasion tactic, attorneys can present a case in a narrative by thematically 
linking events of a case together chronologically (Rideout, 2008). When an attorney uses 
narrative case presentations, the juror uses that story to understand what happened. 
Individuals transport into narratives, removing their own cognitions and focusing on the 
story (Green et al., 2004). This idea proves to be a highly persuasive tactic, due to high 
experiential system use and the rational system use, resulting in a co-occurrence of the 
dual processing systems. 
Transportation. Narratives are used by attorneys to persuade jurors, as they (the 
jurors) transport themselves into the narrative. The story model, which investigates jury 
decision-making exclusively, provides evidence about narrative persuasiveness 
(Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Jurors will use past experiences to explain behaviors and 
fill in the gaps in the narrative presentation (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). The use of past 
experiences to close causal gaps in the story model also relates to CEST. The story 
model, however, does not provide a way to make predictions about how and whether 
individuals will be persuaded by the narrative and able to transport into narratives 
(Polavin, 2019). Transportation occurs when all mental systems focus on events 
occurring in the narrative, bringing audiences into the story (Green & Brook, 2000). This 




narrative. In contrast, for example, the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) cannot 
explain transportation in jury decision-making. Transportation cannot be placed on the 
elaboration spectrum, as it evokes a “vicarious cognitive and emotional response” 
(Moyer-Gusé, 2008, p. 409). Transportation requires a co-occurrence between rational 
and experiential system sat once. ELM does not account for both processes functioning 
together in high function, which is a limitation when explaining jury decision-making or 
making predictions about verdicts. 
Identification. Communication research of narratives investigates not only 
transportation into a narrative story, but also identification with the characters within the 
story (Green, 2002). Identification with characters is one component through which 
narratives can change attitudes (Slater & Rouner, 2002). As a reader, individuals adopt 
the character’s goals and plans, thus experiencing emotions for their experiences 
depending on the outcome (Oatley, 1994, 1999). This aligns with CEST, as individuals 
utilize both processing systems to identify with the character within the story to relate and 
rationalize the experiences and characters’ actions. Identification can reinforce or reduce 
existing attitudes in a persuasive narrative (Graaf et al., 2012) In this study, identification 
in the narrative is used as a mechanism of narrative persuasion.  
When jurors rely on narratives, identification, and transportation to understand the 
evidence of a case, they are likely to use the experiential system to guide the rational 
system. The experimental system encodes information with narratives and images 
(Epstein, 1994). Two irrelevant factors, narrative presentation and past experiences, 
which relate to the experiential system, influence the verdict with a possible bias. The 




mental shortcuts to fill the gaps in the story, make sense of ambiguities, and settle 
contradictions. CEST can be used as a model for understanding the influential factors 
resulting from narratives, such as high emotion, stress, heuristics help researchers 
understand the narrative impact. CEST helps in making predictions about the jury 
decision-making process likely persuaded by narratives. 
There are several models of information processing, but a major critique of other 
models is the inability to consider all aspects of information or study individuals with full 
cognitive ability and effort to process information (similar to critiques of ELM above) 
thoroughly. Polavin (2019) made several important contributions to using CEST as a jury 
decision-making model. First, the co-occurrence of high rational/experiential systems 
brings uniqueness to CEST. From that contribution, he found that subjects who engaged 
in high experiential and high rational thought are more persuaded by narrative. He also 
found that the co-occurrence of the dual-process systems operating is what makes CEST 
specifically unique when studying jury decision-making. Understanding CEST and jury 
decision-making are important, but it does not fully eliminate biases in decision-making. 
This study will provide further investigation of CEST as a jury decision-making model 
by considering additional theoretical frameworks 
Attribution Theory 
Attribution theory provides a framework to understand how individuals make 
inferences about the actions of others and oneself. People use their feelings and beliefs to 
explain the cause of an outcome. The purpose of making attributions stems from one’s 
desire for stability and to achieve control over one’s behavior and events (Heider, 1958). 




(2) situational or external factors (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967; 
Weiner, 1974, 1986, 1995). A dispositional factor is grounded in the behavior and 
personality of a person. For example, we may ask ourselves, did this person do this action 
because that is who they are? Another way to make attributions is based on situational 
factors, including the environment an individual is in that potentially influenced the 
action (Heider, 1958). For example, did this person do this action because of the 
influence of the environment they are in? 
Social perceivers use dispositional attributions to associate a cause of behavior 
with the internal characteristics of a person (Harvey et al., 1981). Instead of attributing 
the behavior of someone to environmental factors, observers assign causality to 
personality or motives. Harvey et al. (1981) emphasized the importance of situational 
attributions as they are made when an individual’s behavior is a byproduct of the external 
factors such as the environment. Different factors impact disposition and situational 
attributions, but they both begin with an outcome. Attribution theory begins with a 
behavior, event, or condition that the individuals use to make specific attributions about 
how that a given outcome was attained. Heider (1958) used formulas to explain the 
outcomes for the attribution, which began the foundational research for attribution theory. 
Naïve Analysis of Action 
 The naïve analysis of action sets the groundwork for attribution theory (Heider, 
1958). The naïve analysis of action set forth principles exemplified by individuals when 
determining the causation of an action (Heider, 1958). The thematic principles Heider set 
forth are (1) observation of the action or behavior; (2) assessment of intent; and (3) 




individuals assess the intent dependent on a combination of task difficulty and effective 
environmental force (Heider, 1958). 
Heider’s (1985) study of personal and environmental forces continued to develop 
through the concept of Can X Try. Attribution theory begins with an outcome; “can” and 
“try” are conditions of the outcome. Can is the environmental force, whereas try is the 
personal force. He found three behaviors that influence our action-outcome attribution: 
ability, task difficulty, and effort (Weiner, 1986). Ability and effort (try) are dispositional 
factors, whereas task difficulty (can) is a situational factor. Heider (1958) set up the 
framework for internal and external factors influencing action outcome attributions, but 
internal and external factors can also be studied on an individualistic level. As attribution 
theory continued to expand, Rotter (1966) contributed to the impact of locus of control.  
Locus of Control  
Rotter (1966) studied the locus of control, which is a concept used to explain how 
individuals view rewards, punishments, and other outcomes based on the individual’s 
belief of their control over different experiences and situations that impact their lives. 
Rotter (1966) sought to find a measure of individual differences in generalized 
expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. Individuals with a 
strong internal locus of control believe their personal decisions and efforts guide their 
behavior. Individuals with an external locus of control rely on fate and luck to guide their 
behaviors (Ajzen, 2002). 
The locus of control has been extensively studied in classroom reinforcement, 
rewards, and punishment for success and failure in academic outcomes. When a student 




achieve that action, the student typically perceives it as luck (Rotter, 1966; Weiner, 
1986). Students with an external locus of control will believe the external factor of luck 
determined the outcome rather than the student’s behavior controlling action outcome. 
The student would perceive this event as unpredictable because the environment 
surrounding this belief would be due to external control. Internal control is when the 
student perceives that the reward or punishment is due to their own behavior or other 
invariant characteristics (Rotter, 1966). 
Individuals with a stronger internal locus of control have higher expectancies for 
success because they attribute their ability to their own control. Individuals with an 
external locus of control have a lower expectancy of success because they rely on 
external factors such as luck. Weiner (1986) explained expectancies using a tennis match 
comparison: a tennis player winning a match leads to high expectancies of success 
because of the player’s abilities (internal). A tennis player winning the coin toss at the 
beginning of the game leads to lower expectancies of success because the win was based 
on the player’s luck (external) (Weiner, 1986). Weiner’s example is consistent with other 
research. Holden et al. (2019) found college student athletes with an external locus of 
control feel little control over their circumstances. The external locus of control causes 
student athletes to have lower expectancies of success, causing them higher amounts of 
perceived stress (Holden et al., 2019). Karkoulain et al. (2016) also studied perceived 
stress and locus of control but focused on the impact on work-life balance. They found 
work-life balance expectancies shift when employees with an internal locus of control 
report higher perceived stress (Karkoulian et al., 2016). Expectancies shifted as the 




between a sense of personal control and stress and the expectancies individuals have for a 
specific outcome. The individual's, expectancies may shift based on internal and external 
factors, like perceived stress, resulting in a possible change of future behavior or events. 
Both loci of control and attribution theory focus on behaviors directly related to internal 
and external factors. There are several similarities between Heider (1958) and Rotter 
(1966), although the two studies did not cite one another. Weiner (1971, 1974) 
recognized each body of literature had some missing pieces, combining the two and 
refining the work, beginning the attribution theory of motivation. 
Achievement Expectancy 
 Weiner (1971) combined the work of Heider (1958) and Rotter (1966) to build 
four perceived causes of achievement: two internal (ability and effort) and two externals 
(task difficulty and luck). These proposed causes mirror Rotter’s locus of control and 
may provide insight into attributions for achievement.  Weiner (1974, 1986) further 
studied Heider’s (1958) research in collaboration with Rotter’s (1966) and expectancy 
value theory by investigating attribution theory of motivation in a three-dimensional 
model: (1) stability, (2) locus of control, and (3) controllability. In earlier research, 
Weiner used an intrapersonal approach to create the attribution theory; but as the theory 
developed, he incorporated emotions and refined controllability to effectively use 
attribution theory through an interpersonal lens. The theoretical structure for both 
intrapersonal and interpersonal are identical; the contrast between the two is the causal 
inferences made. Intrapersonal causal inferences are of oneself and interpersonal 
inferences are causal inferences about others. 




 In the interpersonal theory of attribution, the dimension of controllability is the 
most important among the three dimensions. Weiner (1995) refined controllability by 
using the distinction between control and responsibility from a criminal justice 
perspective to refine how controllability is used in attribution theory. For example, if 
someone mentally unstable commits a crime, the act is controllable. However, because of 
their mental state, that individual does not bear responsibility (Weiner, 1995). Weiner 
(1995) explains the attribution-responsibility-action model in a formula: thinking 
(perception of responsibility), emotions (anger and sympathy), and actions (interpersonal 
evaluation). The theoretical framework offers a broad but unifying perspective to help 
individuals explain motivational behavior. Weiner's (1995) attribution-responsibility-
action model predicts that people are more likely to punish an actor who caused a 
problem when people make higher internal attributions by blaming the actor and lower 
external attributions by blaming the situation. Internal attributions suggest the actor is 
responsible, whereas external attributions suggest the actor to be less responsible (Jeong, 
2009). For example, if person B perceives person A’s problem to be caused by an internal 
factor under A’s control, person B also perceives person A to be more responsible for 
their problem, resulting in a high level of blame. 
Attribution theory is an extremely broad framework that has been studied 
extensively with a variety of behaviors, events, and conditions. For example, support has 
been found for attribution theory in academic achievement (Batool & Akhter, 2012), 
poverty (Ige & Nekhwevha, 2014), aggressive driving (Wickens et al., 2011), job loss 
(Prussia et al., 1993), chronic fatigue (White et al., 2006), and HIV/AIDS (Cobb & de 




theory has also been used in conjunction with communication behaviors, examining 
different types of communications that affect the attribution of responsibility and 
controllability (Chaudhry & Loewenstien, 2019), interpersonal communication and 
relationships within an organization (Barry & Crant, 2000), patient-provider health 
communication (Burgess et al., 2019), online and offline communication inconsistencies 
(DeAndrea & Walther, 2011), media effects (Knobloch-Westerwick & Taylor, 2008), 
crisis communication (Jeong, 2009; Hwang & Jeong 2012), and victim communication 
about crime and trauma (Kosenko & Laboy, 2014). These studies and other extensive 
research about attribution theory focus on the impact of attribution in a variety of 
contexts. 
Attribution Theory and Jury Decision-Making 
Finch and Munro’s (2005) study examined the attribution of responsibility and 
blame in rape trials involving intoxication. The study used small focus groups and a real 
time trial simulation. The case consistently presented two people who knew each other 
but were not intimate, met at a party, and engaged in intercourse. The intoxicant, level of 
intoxication, and administration of the drug varied between each scenario. The study’s 
findings indicated that jurors frequently have personal beliefs and attitudes that influence 
attributions of blame and responsibility. Participants relied on legally irrelevant factors 
and requested the woman’s sexual history (Finch & Munro, 2005). Participants made 
causal attributions from external behavioral factors when they questioned the woman’s 
sexual morality. Following Weiner’s (1995) formula, if the juror (person B) perceives the 
rape to be the woman’s (person A) fault due to sexual history, the juror (person B) would 




level of blame. Jurors making inferences about a victim’s behavior causing the 
responsibility of the crime exemplify that they have an internal locus of control, whereas 
jurors that make inferences about the environment and situation possess an external locus 
of control (Rotter, 1966; Grubb & Turner, 2012) which would result in low levels of 
blame. This study links the importance of attribution theory and jury decision-making, 
but there is research to conduct to better understand the impact of attributions in jury 
decision-making. 
Attribution theory can help people make inferences about others’ behavior that 
may not always be correct. According to Heider (1958), “the search for relatively 
enduring aspects of our world, the dispositional qualities in nature, may carry us quite far 
from the immediate facts, or they may end only a step from them” (p. 80). Individuals 
underestimate the situational factors and overestimate dispositional factors to fulfill their 
desire to explain human behavior (Harman, 1999). The term fundamental attribution error 
was officially created by Ross (1977) and has supported research in several scenarios. 
Attributions about the cause of a defendant’s behavior are typically dispositional, where 
jurors assume that the defendant’s action was the result of their dispositional factors and 
not the defendant’s situational circumstances (Kassin & Sukel, 1997). 
Fundamental Attribution Error  
 Fundamental attribution error (FAE) is a cognitive bias and can be viewed as a 
heuristic. Deriving from the experiential system, FAE can lessen the effort and make 
hasty attributions to other’s behaviors with dispositional factors rather than various 
situational factors (Shtudiner et al. 2017).  Individuals' spontaneously process 




individual makes an attempt to understand others’ behaviors and intentions (Moran et al., 
2014). Researchers in this area have suggested that stressful conditions that interfere with 
the rational system and exacerbate heuristic biases cause decision-makers to shift toward 
the experiential system (Evans, 2003; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Reyna, 2004).   
By understanding the impact of effort, spontaneity, and emotion on cognitive 
biases and FAE, jurors who rely on the experiential system will likely make mental 
shortcuts to reduce the complexity of the decision and make a fundamental attribution 
error about behaviors of individuals involved in the case if they do not have the ability to 
override the system interaction. The CEST model, experiential system explains how 
jurors use previous experiences to cause emotional responses during decision-making 
(Lieberman, 2002). This model in turn can inform how internal and external factors 
influence decision-making, cognitive biases (heuristics), and emotion and provides a 
theoretical framework for this study. 
CEST provides a framework to study jury decision-making as the experiential and 
rational systems interact. The rational system requires logic and evidence to justify 
decision-making (Epstein, 1994). Trials have a variety of pieces of evidence to use to 
rationalize and justify decision-making like the presentations of evidence, expert 
testimonies, eyewitnesses, and probability statistics. Jurors commonly use this system as 
they typically take their service seriously and thoroughly think through evidence that was 
presented in a trial (Vidmar & Seidman-Diamond, 2000). The slow and analytical process 
of jury decision-making requires members to use the rational system of CEST. However, 




stated, jurors bring a variety of multigroup commitments, experiences, and emotions to 
the court room which influence the verdict. 
As the theoretical foundation, CEST information processing and decision-making 
will drive this research. Attribution theory offers a unique perspective to understanding 
juror biases and liability attributions. The bona fide group perspective offers a unique 
insight to studying jurors outside of a group deliberation by understanding the impact of 
multigroup membership. This theoretical framework will help researchers understand 
decision-making processing and biases. It will also help the legal field gain a stronger 
ability to predict jury decision-making through a refined way of understanding 
information processing. 
Communication research is needed to understand the links between jury decision-
making, information processing, and communication presentation. Ultimately, what is at 
stake is the accuracy of the jury decision-making in high emotional civil cases. A better 
understanding of case presentation and eyewitness testimony details on jury decision-
making will help researchers and legal professionals present jurors with the best 
information of a case. Therefore, the following hypotheses and research questions guide 
this study: 
H1: Jurors who receive the high unrelated detail eyewitness testimony will favor 
the defendant more than jurors who receive low unrelated detail eyewitness testimony. 
H2: Jurors with an external locus of control will attribute liability to the defendant 
more than jurors with an internal locus of control. 












 The purpose of this study is to understand jury decision-making and build a 
unified framework to predict future jury decisions by analyzing mock jurors’ loci of 
control, narrative case presentation, and verdicts. This chapter explains the overall 
research design for this study, including a description of the research setting, sample, 
instrumentation, and procedures. The four purposes of this chapter are to (1) describe the 
design of this study; (2) explain the population sample selection; (3) describe the 
procedures of data collection; and (4) provide an explanation of the quantitative analysis 
and ethical considerations. The following hypotheses and research questions will be 
investigated: 
H1: Jurors who receive the high unrelated detail eyewitness testimony will favor 
the defendant more than jurors who receive low unrelated detail eyewitness testimony. 
H2: Jurors with an external locus of control will attribute liability to the defendant 
more than jurors with an internal locus of control. 
RQ1: How do jurors with external group membership attribute liability? 
RQ2: How do jurors who override the experiential system attribute liability? 
Study Design 
 The experimental study design is modeled after Lieberman (2002) and Polavin 
(2019) information processing conditions of high experiential and high rational 
processing (Appendix A). Additionally, rather than using physical attractiveness biases 
(Lieberman 2002) or narrative and non-narrative case presentation (Polavin, 2019) as the 




factor is modeled after the Bell and Loftus (1989) presentation type of high or low 
eyewitness testimony detail. This study combined the two experimental designs by 
utilizing a 2 (presentation type: high or low irrelevant detail testimony) x 1 (processing: 
high experiential/high rational) between-subjects factorial design. Dependent measures 
include locus of control, the liability of the defendant, verdict, and damages awarded to 
the plaintiff. Subjects were randomly be assigned one of the two conditions.  
Subjects were told that they were going to read about a civil lawsuit and be asked 
to determine defendant liability and damages. First subjects provided demographic 
information (e.g age, biological sex, race/ethnicity, education, household income, and 
political affiliation) and answered the locus of control questionnaire (Appendix B). 
Subjects will be given case instructions (Appendix C), jury instructions (Appendix D), 
case presentation (Appendix E), and then one witness statement (Appendix F). The case 
instructions, jury instructions, and case presentation will induct subjects into a high 
rational and high experiential processing mode by including emotional language and 
analytical encouragement (Polavin, 2019). The subjects were given additional evidence in 
the form of an eyewitness testimony presentation which includes a single sentence high 
or low irrelevant detail, and then asked to complete a final verdict form assigning guilt, 
liability, and monetary award. Finally, participants completed the rational experiential 
inventory (Appendix G) and the cognitive reflection test. 
Sample 
 This study aimed to better understand jury decision-making in conjunction with 
communication, information processing and locus of control. Before beginning the study, 




Following approval, I used QuestionPro survey software to complete the online study. A 
convenience sample was used to obtain a sample of participants over the age of 18, the 
minimum age to serve on a jury. Participants for a convenience sample were recruited 
from South Dakota State University mass communications introductory course, other 
students and faculty, personal social networks, as well as via email recruitment. A total of 
N = 231 people began the study. Subjects who spent less than five minutes on the study 
were excluded from the study because they were likely not paying attention to the detail 
in the study. Subjects who did not complete the study were excluded from the analysis of 
the study. A final sample of N = 121 was attained, ensuring at least 50 subjects per 
condition, described below.  
 On average, subjects were 29.7 years old (SD = 22.8), and women made up over 
half of the sample (69.8%). Regarding race, the sample was predominantly White at 
93.6%, with 1.7% Asian, 1.2% Hispanic or Latino (Mexican, Mexican American, 
Chicano), 1.7% Multiracial, .58% Black or African American, .58% other, and .58% 
preferring not to say. Over half of the respondents indicated they lived in South Dakota 
(59.7%). The majority of the sample (36.5%) had completed some college or obtained a 
Bachelor’s degree (31.4%). Other educational attainment included a Doctorate (2.3%), a 
Master’s degree (8.4%), an Associate’s degree (8.1%),  1.7%  completed trade, technical, 
or vocational (1.7%), and high school diploma (11.6%). Regarding political affiliation, 
44.2% identify as Republican (strong = 23.5%, weak = 38.7%), 26.2% Democrat (strong 
= 21.9%, weak = 15.9%), 23.8% independent, and 5.8% identified as other. Household 
income was measured in $20,000 increments, with 20.38% of the participants making 




60,000, 12.1% bring in 60,001 to 80,000, 12.1% earning 80,001 to 100,000, and 24.2% 
obtaining 100,001 or more per year.  
Procedure 
Case and Presentation. Subjects read a civil lawsuit about a fatal pedestrian-
automobile accident where the pedestrian was crossing the street. He was hit and killed 
by the defendant who was driving a car. The case details are similar to Lieberman (2002) 
and consist of a combination of Polavin’s (2019) rational and experiential induction 
presentation. The defendant who hit the pedestrian claims he shouldn’t be held liable 
because the circumstances prevented him from being able to stop in time. The victim was 
jaywalking, not on a crosswalk, at the time of the accident. The plaintiff, the victim’s 
wife, claims the defendant was distracted, preventing him from having enough time to 
stop. The victim’s wife brought the civil lawsuit to court against the driver, requesting 
$7,000 for funeral expenses and $200,000 for pain and suffering damages. The case is 
intentionally ambiguous to measure the influence of the variable manipulation (Polavin, 
2019). 
 The case presentation is a mixture of narrative and non-narrative presentation. 
The overview, accident information, victim information, accusation of negligence, and 
defendant’s case were presented as statements of fact in paragraph form with pieces of 
vivid and emotional language.  
Information Processing. Subjects were presented the jury and case instructions, 
as well as one case presentation. The case presentation included emotional language (Li, 
Coduto, & Moore, 2019), such as “graphic,” “vivid,” “upsetting,” “feelings,” “put 




processing. Using the phrase “put yourself in their shoes.” will further induct participants 
into identification (Graaf et al., 2012). In contrast, participants were inducted into high 
rational processing by including language that is mathematical and accuracy oriented, 
such as “numerical,” “addition and multiplication,” “calculations,” “accurate,” and 
“determine a percentage of liability.” The inclusion of experiential and rational process 
induction language is modeled after Polavin’s (2019) study, as are the jury and case 
instructions.  
Eyewitness testimony manipulation. Polavin’s (2019) additional evidence prior 
to the final verdict contained information from cellphone records about the defendant 
possibly texting during or near the time of the accident. This study used a similar concept 
of additional evidence; however, this study uses eyewitness testimony as additional 
evidence. Bell and Loftus (1989) studied the impact of the degree of detail (related and 
unrelated) of eyewitness testimony on the jurors’ judgment of guilt. This study will 
utilize unrelated details as the irrelevant factor in the single eyewitness, the wife, of the 
fatal pedestrian-automobile accident. 
 The subjects will be randomly assigned one of two eyewitness testimonies: high 
unrelated detail (n = 66) and low unrelated detail (n= 65) that were adapted from Polavin 
(2019) to fit this study. The two eyewitness testimonies included the same information, 
with the exception of one sentence of high/low unrelated detail. The singular sentence of 
unrelated detail is important to CEST because the high unrelated detail testimony 
possibly produces an emotional reaction to be processed by the experiential system. The 




character of the victim possibly influencing the identification of the jurors with the 
victim. 
Manipulation Checks.  Following the case and jury instructions, subjects read 
the case and answered the following question to measure manipulation of emotional 
impact and analytical consideration. For the experiential processing measure following 
the case presentation, subjects were told, “Using the slider below, rank the emotional 
impact the case had on you” with a slide scale (1 = little or no emotional impact; 100 = 
strong or significant emotional impact). Following the eyewitness testimony, participants 
were told, “Using the slider below, rank the emotional impact the eyewitness testimony 
statement had on you” with a slider scale (1 = little or no emotional impact; 100 = strong 
or significant emotional impact). Additionally, to measure rational processing, 
participants were told, “Using the slider below, rank how much of your decision was 
based on an analytical consideration of the evidence with a slider scale (1=little or no 
consideration, 100=strong or significant consideration)”.  Independent samples t-tests 
were used to analyze the three manipulation checks. 
Measures 
Locus of control. Subjects completed the Internality, Powerful Others, Chance 
scale (Levenson, 1981). The multidimensional scale investigates internality, powerful 
others, and chance on a 24 item 5-point Likert-scale (1=strongly disagree; 5 = strongly 
agree). This was adapted from Rotter’s (1966) general forced paradigm to ask 
participants about their personal experiences rather than the perspective about the general 
population. Levenson (1981) added the external subscales to encompass adults lived 




averaged to create a measure of powerful others (M = 2.70, SD = .56), chance (M = 2.57, 
SD = .54), and internality (M = 3.61,  SD = .45).  The powerful other was reliable 
(Cronbach’s α = .75) as was chance (Cronbach’s α = .75); however, internality did not 
reach reliability (Cronbach’s α = .54). Some scale items were dropped in an attempt to 
make the internality scale more reliable. 
Guilt. Following the jury and case instructions, case presentation, and eyewitness 
testimony, the participants were asked to decide if the victim was guilty (1) or not guilty 
(0). A majority of the subjects ruled that the defendant was not guilty (78.5%), although 
some participants ruled not guilty (21.5%).  
Liability. The second dependent variable asked subjects what percentage of 
liability they attributed to the defendant. This measurement ranged from 1% to 100%, 
and participants used a slider to select the value. Subjects, on average, indicated that the 
victim was mostly to blame by attributing less liability to the defendant (M = 32.81, SD = 
23.83).  
Awards. All subjects were asked how much award money should be given to the 
plaintiff; only N = 22 participants responded (the rest did not believe any money should 
be awarded). They were asked, “What amount of monetary damages would you award 
the plaintiff (victim's wife)? ($0-$207,000, if $0 put zero)”. Participants were asked to 
enter the number amount in the comment box. The monetary award from the participants 
who award the victim damages were averaged (M = 16,975.00, SD = 29,492.00).  
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI). The REI is the 40-item individual 
difference measure that assesses the traits for the general levels of CEST rational and 




item dimensions (rational and experiential) were averaged to create a measure or the 
experiential and rational processing. This 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly agree; 7 = 
strongly disagree) has two dimensions with 20-items per dimension made of two 
subscales (5) ability and (5) engagement for the experiential processing and the rational 
processing that this study will use as control variables. Experiential ability (e.g., “I 
believe in trusting my hunches”) measures one’s ability to use the experiential system to 
process information whereas, experiential engagement (e.g., “I like to rely on my 
intuitive impressions”) measures the amount that an individual engages the experiential 
system. Rational ability (e.g., “I have a logical mind”) measures the ability to engage in 
rational information processing whereas, rational engagement (e.g., “I enjoy intellectual 
challenges”) measures the amount an individual engages the rational system (Pacini & 
Epstein, 1999). The 20 rational items were averaged to create a measure of rational 
processing (M = 3.73, SD = .46). Likewise, the 20 experiential items were averaged to 
create a measure of experiential processing (M = 3.37, SD = .45). In this study, these two 
dimensions of the REI were used as control variables. The rational dimension was 
reliable (Cronbach’s α = .84) as was the experiential dimension (Cronbach’s α = .86).  
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). The cognitive reflection test measured 
subject’s ability to override experiential system intuition with the rational system to reach 
the correct conclusion. Subjects that answer the test questions correctly have the ability to 
use the rational system to override the initial intuition from the experiential system, thus 
connecting CRT to CEST (Toplak et al., 2011). Fredrick (2005) asked subjects questions 
that almost everyone answers quickly and intuitively, but only those who override their 




one dollar more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? The correct answer is .05.). 
Answers to this question were coded as correct (1) or incorrect (0). Most participants 
were incorrect: 77 (63.8%) of the participants answered incorrectly and 44 (36.4%) of the 
participants answered the question correctly.  
Analysis 
Hypothesis one predicts jurors who receive the high unrelated detail eyewitness 
testimony will favor the defendant more than jurors who receive low unrelated 
eyewitness testimony. A chi-square test was conducted to determine if the high unrelated 
detail eyewitness testimony influenced the jurors’ guilty verdict of the defendant. An 
independent samples t-test was conducted to test hypothesis two, which predicts jurors 
with an external locus of control will attribute liability to the defendant more than jurors 
with an internal locus of control. A regression analysis was used to examine the influence 
of LOC on the amount of liability attributed to the defendant. Research question one 
considers juror’s multigroup membership influence on the liability decision. This 
question takes juror’s race, gender, and education into consideration when analyzing the 
interaction between the two. An analysis of variance between member’s race and 
education and the liability decisions helps us understand the interaction between the two. 
An independent samples t-test was also used to analyze the relationship between political 
affiliation, Republican and Democrat, and liability to test the relationship. Research 
question two considers how jurors who override the experiential system attribute liability. 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to analyze the relationship between the 




 To increase the validity and credibility of my research, I used three separate 
manipulation checks throughout the survey. Manipulation checks investigate the 
relationship between aroused empathy and persuasive effects of the messaging (O’Keef, 
2003). To do this, I ask two questions about the emotional impact of the messaging, as 
well as a question regarding the amount of analytical consideration included in the 
decision-making process. The manipulation checks regarding emotion impact occurred 
initially following the case presentation and again after the eyewitness testimony 
statement. The manipulation checks did not detect significance between the case 
presentation or high and low eyewitness testimony; however, the analytical consideration 
revealed significance following the verdict form.  
Ethical Considerations 
This study includes possibly sensitive information and language. Participants will 
receive a content warning prior to the jury and case instructions about the highly 
emotional content. Participants will have the ability to leave the study at any time. The 
South Dakota State University mass communication introductory course received extra 
credit upon study participation. Other students, faculty, and personal contacts will not 
receive compensation. The content of this study requires several ethical considerations 







 This chapter will present the results from 121 survey participants. These 
participants were recruited through a convenience sample of people over the age of 18 
who agreed to the consent form. In order to preserve confidentiality, I have removed all 
participant identifiers by removing their IP addresses (which the survey software collects 
automatically) from the data set. In order to test the hypotheses and answer the research 
questions from this study, the following analyses were conducted.  
Correlational analyses were used to examine the relationship between rational 
processing, experiential processing, and locus of control (powerful others, chance, 
internality). The correlations of experiential processing with rational processing and locus 
of control were not significant. Correlations with key variables are in Table 1 (Appendix 
H). 
Manipulation Check. I tested the effectiveness of the perception manipulation 
and whether the subjects’ experiential processing was influenced by the case presentation 
and eyewitness testimony. The first and second manipulation checks measured the 
perception of emotional impact after the case presentation as well as after the eyewitness 
testimony. The third manipulation check, following the verdict, measured the amount of 
rational consideration the participants used during their decision. Independent samples t-
tests were used for all manipulation checks. The first manipulation check was asked 
following the case presentation. Manipulation check one was non-significant, t(119) = -
.42, p = .64  The high unrelated detail eyewitness testimony group (M = 44.27, SD = 




group (M = 46.14, SD = 24.86) and emotional impact. Manipulation check two, following 
the eyewitness testimony, was non-significant, t(199) = .42, p = .87. This manipulation 
check indicated no difference between the high unrelated detail eyewitness testimony 
group (M = 40.76, SD = 23.45) and low unrelated detail eyewitness testimony group (M = 
41.48, SD = 25.27) related to emotional impact. Lastly, a manipulation check was used to 
test subjects’ rational processing effectiveness following the verdict form. This 
manipulation check was significant, t(119) = 2.16, p = .032. The high detail group (M = 
86.03, SD = 14.57) was meaningfully different from the low detail group (M = 79.00, SD 
= 20.85). 
Guilt. H1 predicted that jurors who receive the high unrelated detail eyewitness 
testimony will find the defendant not guilty more than jurors who receive low unrelated 
detail eyewitness testimony. A chi-square test was conducted to determine if the high 
unrelated detail eyewitness testimony influenced the jurors’ guilty verdict of the 
defendant. The results were significant, χ2(1) = 4.04, p = 0.04. The participants who 
received the high unrelated detail eyewitness testimony were more likely to decide the 
defendant was not guilty. Thus, H1 is supported.  
Liability. H2 predicted that jurors with greater external locus of control will 
attribute liability to the defendant more than jurors with internal locus of control. A 
regression analysis was used to examine the influence of LOC on the amount of liability 
attributed to the defendant. The regression model was not significant, (F(3,115) = .59, p = 
.61) with an R2 of .015. Although overall model significance was not achieved, the 
influence of LOC follows the direction predicted. Model coefficients indicate that 




= 2.89, SE = 4.7, p > .001. Subjects with external LOC (chance) attributed more liability 
to the defendant, B = 2.87, SE = 4.9 p > .001. Subjects with internal LOC (internality) 
attribute less liability to the defendant, B = -1.05, SE = 5.1, p > .001. This is consistent 
with H2. 
RQ1 asked how jurors’ group membership influenced liability. Subjects’ political 
affiliation was used as one potential group choice in the analysis for this research 
question. An independent samples t-test was non-significant, t(70) = 1.05, p = .29. There 
was no difference between identifying as Republican (M = 29.48, SD = 24.69) and 
identifying as Democrat (M = 35.13, SD = 22.11) in determining liability.  Additionally, 
education was used as another group choice in the analysis. A one-way ANOVA was 
conducted to compare the effect of amount of education on the amount of liability 
assigned to the defendant. An analysis of variance showed that the effect of education on 
liability was non-significant, F(7,113) = 1.32, p = 2.5. These results related to liability led 
to additional analysis; see below.  
RQ2 asked how jurors’ who override the experiential system attribute liability. An 
independent samples t-test was non-significant, t(119) = -0.85, p = .39. There was no 
significant difference between those who passed the CRT test (M = 30.41, SD = 21.01) 
and those who did not (M = 34.23, SD = 25.33) 
Additional Analysis  
After initial analysis, H2 was further probed by analyzing the influence of rational 
and experiential thinking (the rational-experiential inventory, REI) on the amount of 
liability attributed to the defendant. The overall model achieved significance, R2 of .15 




rational processing attributed less liability to the defendant, B = -20.183, p = .000. 
Subjects inducted into experiential processing didn’t indicate a relationship with liability 
to the defendant, B = -.64, p = .89. Rational processing was the only significant predictor 
of a decrease in defendant liability. Additionally, a regression analysis was conducted to 
analyze the influence of REI on N = 22 participants who gave a monetary award. The 
regression analysis was not significant, (F (2,39) = 2.53, p = .09) with a R2 of .115. 
Rational (B = -19905.93, SE = 4.46 p = .09) and experiential (B = 18189.58, SE = 4.53 p 
= .24) processing were not predictors of monetary award. 
Furthermore, analysis of the relationship between LOC and the damages awarded to 
the victim was conducted. The regression model was significant, (F (3,40) = 6.39, p = 
.001) with an R2 of .324. Model coefficients indicate that subjects with external LOC 
(powerful others) award more damages to the victim, B = 28622.58, SE = 11820.06, p < 
.02. Subjects with external LOC (chance) was non-significant, B = 18089.37, SE = 
11545.95, p > .13. Subjects with internal LOC (internality) awarded more damages to the 








 This chapter will provide further insight and analysis on the hypotheses and 
research question, the theoretical and practical implications from the results of the study, 
limitations of the study, and areas for future research. The results of this study further 
confirm CEST as a jury decision making model and begin to showcase the use of 
attribution theory in jury decision-making research. 
Analysis Interpretations  
This study was conducted to test the influential factors that impact jury decision-
making. CEST can account for how irrelevant factors impact jury decision-making, and 
attribution theory offers a perspective to understanding liability attributions to further 
understand juror biases. This thesis has argued CEST rational and experiential 
information processing components allow jurors to process high rational and high 
experiential information simultaneously. Co-occurrence of both systems then relies on 
jurors to actively override their intuition to use rational cognitive processing to come to a 
veracious verdict. Additionally, attribution theory can account for juror information 
interpretations and biases that occur during information processing. Overall, the results 
showed that eyewitness testimonies have an impact on jury decision-making. The results 
also suggest locus of control is an influential factor on verdict outcomes. 
H1 was supported in this study. This predicted that participants in the high 
unrelated detail eyewitness testimony would be more likely to find the defendant not 
guilty. Participants indicated that there was not a strong emotional impact from the high 




results of the chi-square test confirm hypothesis one and indicate that participants who 
received the high unrelated detail eyewitness testimony found the defendant not guilty 
more than the participants who received to the low unrelated detail eyewitness testimony. 
The next hypothesis shifted focus to attribution theory, specifically locus of 
control, as a predictor for defendant liability. H2 did not achieve significance; however, it 
trended in the predicted direction of the study. Participants with a stronger sense of 
external LOC, those who rely on powerful others and chance, attributed greater liability 
to the defendant. This result supports the attribution theory of responsibility. The Weiner 
(1995) proposed model is applicable in this case in regard to a juror’s LOC: thinking 
(perception of responsibility), emotions (anger and sympathy), and actions (interpersonal 
evaluation). If the juror perceives the accident to be caused by contributing external 
factors, eliciting sympathy for the victim, the juror also perceives those external factors to 
be more responsible for the problem, contributing to causal attribution resulting in higher 
liability associated with the defendant rather than the victim. Jurors that make inferences 
about the environment and situation possess an external locus of control (Rotter, 1966; 
Grubb & Turner, 2012) which would result in low levels of blame of the victim and high 
responsibility for the defendant. 
The correlational analysis results indicate individuals who have an internal locus 
of control (internality) also experience rational thinking. In contrast, individuals who 
have a greater external locus of control (chance) tend to have less rational processing, as 
these variables have a negative correlation. Additionally, external locus of control 
(powerful others) has a negative correlation with rational processing. These results 




defendant less liability, thus relying on rational processing. Although H2 was not 
supported, the relationship trend between LOC and liability, as well as LOC and rational 
processing, should not be dismissed from future research and implications. 
Jurors with a stronger internal LOC associated less liability to the defendant. 
Fundamental attribution error offers another explanation to jurors assigning lower 
liability to the defendant. Individuals making an attempt to understand others’ behaviors 
and intentions (Moran et al., 2014) put themselves in the position of the defendant and 
the victim. Jurors with an internal LOC overestimate the dispositional factors of the 
victim, such as his feeling of invincibility from the high unrelated detail eyewitness 
testimony, would result in the jurors attributing more liability for the accident to the 
victim; thus, resulting in less liability to the defendant.  
RQ1 asked whether jurors’ group memberships influence liability. The analysis 
showed that participants’ political affiliation did not significantly influence their liability 
decision. Political affiliation was chosen for possible influential group membership 
because Democrat and Republican political affiliations can be considered extremes 
(Mutz, 2018, Sunstein, 2000). The result may have achieved significance if the political 
affiliations were truly extremes. However, of the 76 participants that indicated they 
identify as Republican, 46 of them identified their strength of political affiliation as weak 
Republican. Thus, the party identification was less extreme. Additionally, race was 
initially chosen for a possible influential group membership; however, more than 90 
percent of my participants identified as white (n = 115). More research must be 
conducted to determine if race could be a jury decision-making influential factor, 




with bona fide group perspective, although multigroup membership is important in future 
jury decision-making research. 
RQ2 asked how jurors who override the experiential system attribute liability. The 
analysis indicated that participants who answered the CRT question (e.g., a bat and ball 
cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs one dollar more than the ball. How much does the ball 
cost?) correctly did not exhibit meaningful differences from those who answered the 
question incorrectly. Participants were inducted into high rational and high experiential 
processing; thus, the co-occurrence of the systems worked together, ultimately 
influencing one another’s operation (Epstein, 2003) 
Additional analysis was conducted to further probe H1 to analyze the influence of 
rational-experiential inventory (REI) on the amount of liability attributed to the defendant 
as well as the amount of damages awarded to the victim. The result indicated that 
participants relying on the rational processing system attributed less liability to the 
defendant. The results did not suggest a relationship between defendant liability and 
experiential processing. Rational and experiential processing was not a predictor for 
monetary award. Furthermore, powerful others and internality were predictors for 
monetary award from the small sample (N = 22). Chance did not support a difference in 
monetary award.  
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory 
This study has further confirmed CEST as a jury decision-making model. The 
rational processing manipulation check following the verdict form was significant. The 
experiential processing manipulation checks following the case presentation and 




REI. Experiential processing has no relationship to jurors attributing liability to the 
defendant. The experiential processing was non-significant in predicting the outcome of 
liability. This trend was expected when participants indicated that they were not 
emotionally influenced by the case presentation or the eyewitness testimony. On the other 
hand, the final manipulation check for rational processing was significant. The 
participants indicated that they rationally analyzed the evidence of the case. This 
manipulation check also supported the post-hoc analysis of REI. The rational processing 
predicts how liability is attributed. Understanding CEST has implications in the legal 
field. Attorneys’ knowledge of rational and experiential processing will help prepare for 
strategies when going to trial. CEST’s high experiential processing allows jurors’ 
emotions to overcome rational thinking. Case presentations can activate both rational and 
experiential processing simultaneously. Attorneys can use this finding to influence case 
presentation by equally presenting emotional and analytical information for jury members 
to process. 
The important contribution from this study is the evidence that the high unrelated 
detail in the eyewitness testimony influenced the verdict. This study argues that jurors are 
inducted into high rational and high experiential information processing from the case 
presentation and the eyewitness testimony. Participants indicated they had an average of 
45 percent emotional impact from the case and 41 percent emotional impact from the 
eyewitness testimony.  Individuals engaged in a co-occurrence of the two systems are still 
susceptible to the influence of irrelevant factors. The results of the third manipulation 
check achieved significance, with participants using analytic consideration of the 




high unrelated detail had on their verdict. The civil case study further supports the 
uniqueness of CEST co-occurrence allowing for both systems to function simultaneously, 
as participants rely on both analytical and emotional processing to make a decision. This 
relationship could be a predictor for guilt attributed to the defendant. This is consistent 
with the argument that a combination of the two processes is used to process narratives 
(Polavin, 2019). Communication research may offer an explanation of the impact of 
narrative processing. 
Transportation 
Jurors who receive the high unrelated detail eyewitness testimony were more 
likely to find the defendant not guilty. This study examined narratives in communication 
research as an explanation of this influence. Jurors use past experiences to explain 
behaviors and fill in the gaps in the narrative presentation (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). 
The jurors that did not receive the high unrelated detail likely used their prior experiences 
to fill the gaps of unrelated detail in testimony. The low unrelated detail did not include 
any irrelevant detail about who the victim was. Jurors who do not have a complete story, 
relying on their experiences, may have experiences with a different emotional impact 
than those who received the high unrelated detail testimony. The result of this study 
conveys the importance of detail. When jurors rely on narratives and transportation to 
understand the evidence of a case, they are likely using the experiential system to guide 
the rational system. The experiential system encodes information with narratives and 
images (Epstein, 1994). During an attorney’s case preparation and witness preparation, 
refining the narratives both parties present is imperative to creating a story the jurors can 




without leaving unclear gaps that may lead to jurors relying on the experiences to draw 
conclusion during the narrative transportation. Giving jurors the responsibility to fill the 
gaps of the story may lead to bias resulting in an influence to outcome of the verdict.  
Identification 
Communication research of narratives investigates not only transportation into the 
narrative story but also the characters within the story (Green, 2002). Identification with 
characters is one component through which narratives can change attitudes (Slater & 
Rouner, 2002). I believe identification with the characters (defendant and victim) 
explains the significance of the high unrelated detail eyewitness testimony leading to 
finding the defendant less liable. This practical application within the legal field will 
impact witness preparation. Eyewitnesses tell a story about what they witness at the scene 
of injustice. Attorneys should prepare the witnesses to tell the best story with relevant and 
irrelevant information for jurors to fully understand the details of the case and the 
character of the victim or defendant. In this study, the defendant was found less liable 
because of the character the eyewitness created for the jury. As the literature and results 
for this study suggest, a shift in attitude towards a character in the narrative might be a 
deciding factor in the verdict.  A future study could examine a variety of factors 
influencing an identification shift with the characters in the case. Future researchers can 
examine eyewitness testimony with the same goal told by two different characters and 
consider potential influences in the outcome of the verdict. Another important factor to 
consider is race. This may be particularly true if one considers the race of both the juror 





The juror’s identification with the character (victim) shift in this study resulted from a 
single sentence difference between the high unrelated detail eyewitness testimony and the 
low unrelated detail eyewitness testimony. The wife said “He thought he was invincible” 
when referring to him jaywalking while using his cell phone. The irrelevant factor of 
invincibility changed the character (victim), thus altering the jurors’ perception of the 
victim. This change in character leads to a less sympathetic perspective of the victim 
from the jurors, altering their attitude toward him. As indicated in the results, preparing a 
witness for trial testimony should elicit a change of attitude toward the party involved in 
the case. The high unrelated detail changed the juror’s perception about her husband (the 
victim) influenced the jurors to attribute less liability to the defendant.  
Group Membership 
 The way group membership impacts jury decision-making will require more research 
to accurately predict how impactful they might be. Bona fide group perspective is often 
studied in a natural forming group (Putnam & Stohl, 1996). This requires a group to meet 
in-person where deliberations and questions can make an impact. One form or group 
membership analyze was the participants’ political affiliation, Republican and Democrat. 
Republican and Democrat political affiliations are not considered true extremes because 
political affiliation occurs on a spectrum. To find the true extreme within a political 
affiliation or ideology, future researchers should consider asking common politically 
polarizing views. For example, Van Swol (2009) studied extreme members and group 
polarization by asking participants to rate their opinion about the decriminalization of 
marijuana on a 1 to 9 scale and then discussed the issue in three‐person groups. He 




vocal in discussion (Van Swol, 2009). This could be replicated partially in a survey or 
fully in a small focus group.  
Although both group memberships analyzed in this study lead to insignificant 
findings and my sample did not provide enough diversity to analyze race, bona fide group 
perspective should still be considered when analyzing juries. On an individual level of 
jury decision-making, multigroup membership does not impact the outcome; however, 
multigroup membership may impact jury deliberations, ultimately influencing unanimous 
decisions made by the jury as a group. The study of juries cannot be confined to an online 
survey thus, ignoring the value of group deliberation.  
Future researchers can approach studying group membership by employing mixed 
methods research. First, researchers should conduct an online survey with a goal to 
recruit a wide sample who offer diverse group memberships. Some memberships to 
consider include but are not limited to race, education, income, political affiliation, and 
gender identity. The online survey should include the instruction, case presentation, any 
additional evidence, as well as verdict form. Following the survey, researchers should 
examine jury decision-making and verdict outcomes through a mock trial focus groups in 
groups of twelve people, more closely mimicking the jury experience, with the survey 
participants. Using mixed methodology to gain a better understanding of the group 
interaction influencing a verdict outcome. Analyzing changes in verdict outcome and 
juror deliberation may show biases. Understanding the impacts of group membership on 
jury decision-making may have major implications on jury selection. Further research 
should be conducted to determine whether extreme members should be struck from the 





 There are some limitations to this study to consider when employing applications. 
Although hypothesis one was significant and hypothesis two was not, I believe the 
determining factors were methodological limitations to this study. The results of 
hypothesis two are consistent with jury decision-making in relation to LOC. Although 
hypothesis two was not supported, I believe the support from the data demonstrates 
consistencies with LOC. A larger sample size from a sample that goes beyond a 
convenience sample may result in achieving significance; further research will need to be 
conducted. Additionally, locus of control may have different implications based on 
personal experiences, creating a strong connection with CEST. For example, if a 
participant has been in a car accident, they may identify with the defendant more than 
those who have not. I suggest looking at the internal locus of control from the perspective 
of both the defendant and the victim in relation to the verdict. I believe these reasons are 
a likely explanation; however, more research is necessary. This study could also achieve 
greater external validity by screening participants to simulate the process of a real jury 
would. Requiring jurors to fill out a form to indicate prior experiences related to the case 
would more closely replicate the experience of being on an actual jury. During the pre-
trial jury selection process, counsel may excuse jurors “for cause” or peremptory 
challenges. Eliminating jurors “for cause” requires proof that potential jurors’ biases may 
prevent them from making decisions based solely on the evidence presented at trial. 
Peremptory challenges eliminate potential jurors without reason in cases where counsel 
believes that jurors may be biased if judges reject a “for cause” removal (Babcock et al., 




work, further examining exclusion of jurors who would have possible biases toward the 
case. 
There are also methodological limitations of the study. The Internality, Powerful 
Other, and Chance (IPC) scale achieved reliability for the powerful other and chance 
subscales, but the scale did not achieve suitable reliability from the internality subscale. 
This may be a contributing factor to the result of H2 not reaching significance but 
trending in the pattern predicted. Future improvements to this scale may impact the 
outcome of LOC when compared to other variables. Reverse coding within the IPC scale 
is to avoid respondent biases and avoid inattention. Reversing some items by reversed 
worded items, may decrease item difficulty for those respondents that can agree with the 
reversed items. However, reversed coding may lead to more bias due to confusion for the 
other respondents (Sonderen et al., 2013). The internality subscale did not reach 
reliability, likely cause by participant confusion for reverse coded items. Furthermore, I 
consider the importance of attorneys understanding the influence of a juror’s locus of 
control. Internality, chance, and powerful others measure three different constructs, and 
each subscale requires significant recoding. The use of a different LOC scale would be 
more conducive to practical use for attorneys and possibly result in greater reliability in 
qualitative analysis.  
Additionally, this study did not have a diverse sample collected. A diverse sample is 
necessary to understand how LOC, case presentation, and eyewitness testimonies impact 
jury decision-making. Adjustments to recruitment for future research can be made.  
 Finally, this study is not conducive to extensive jury duty. The survey took place 




eyewitness testimony, there was no deliberation, and no opportunity for the jurors to ask 
questions. To overcome these differences, I included some characteristics that would be 
similar to a jury experience. The survey included a convenience sample of participants 
who were 18 years of age or older. The case information was similar to a case a juror 
would hear in court. There are, however, some different characteristics to the survey than 
what jurors would experience in the courtroom, which may contribute to a change in 
outcomes. 
Directions for Future Research 
 This study offers a variety of insights into jury decision-making. Future research 
can continue to analyze the variable in this study or conduct a deeper analysis into 
individual pieces. First, to strengthen juror identification, a study could be conducted 
using high/low unrelated details told by two different characters all with the same goal. 
This could be measured with thought-listing during the narrative. This could also be 
measured through a verdict form and subsequently analyzing the difference or similarities 
in a verdict. Next, to more rigorously test the relationship between locus of control and 
jury decision-making, a study should test the relationship between internal/external 
control and perceptions of both the defendant and the victim. The research could ask 
about liability for both parties, for instance. This would strengthen the research about 
LOC predicting verdict outcomes. 
Future research can utilize a similar study design with a criminal court case. In this 
study I used a civil case rather than a criminal case. Jurors serving in a criminal 
courtroom must achieve a unanimous decision through jury deliberation. The online 




decision within a study the researcher will need to change to mixed methodology or 
quantitative analysis of a focus group. Small group research can be conducted to analyze 
the impact of multigroup membership of a bona fide group reaching a verdict by allowing 
time for deliberation and question. This would exemplify more qualities of a real-time 
jury versus an online survey. 
Additionally, future researchers should consider the factor of the victim’s race. Here, 
I considered only perceptions of the victim’s attitude. I did not measure other influential 
factors that would be relevant to the perception of the victim. Researchers can use an 
online survey experiment including two narrative case presentations, a verdict form, and 
LOC. The two narrative cases can be randomly assigned to participants utilizing the same 
case; only the victim’s race will be manipulated, with one case where the victim is White, 
and one case where the victim is Black. Researchers must continuously expand field. 
Conclusion 
 This research aimed to identify a theoretical framework to predict jury decision-
making. Based on a quantitative analysis of CEST, LOC, and the final verdict, it can be 
concluded that CEST is an effective model for jury decision making and LOC influences 
jury decision-making. The results indicate that jurors who receive high unrelated detail in 
eyewitness testimonies are more likely to find the defendant not guilty. While LOC limits 
the generalizability of the results due to non-significance, this theoretical approach 
provides new insight into the attributions jurors make during the decision-making 
process. Future research is needed to determine the relationship between LOC, narrative 




The purpose of this study was to understand jury decision-making and build a 
unified framework to predict future jury decisions by analyzing mock jurors’ loci of 
control, narrative case presentation, and verdicts via CEST. This study has begun to build 
a unified framework while opening new opportunities to utilize attribution theory from a 
different perspective. This study showed that CEST can help predict the type of 
information jurors will identify with, consider, and if it will alter their decision. In the 
future some methodological problems should be solved regarding the narrative 
presentation and predictor variable. Overall, CEST and attribution theory can be unified 
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Internality, Powerful Others, Chance, Scale 
Instructions. Consider the following statements and rate your agreement (1 = strongly 
disagree, 5 = strongly agree). 
1. Whether or not I get to be a leader depends mostly on my ability.  
2. To a great extent my life is controlled by accidental happenings.  
3. I feel like what happens in my life is mostly determined by powerful people.  
4. Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on how good a driver I 
am.  
5. When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work.  
6. Often there is no chance of protecting my personal interests from bad luck 
happenings.  
7. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I’m lucky.  
8. Although I might have good ability, I will not be given leadership responsibility 
without appealing to those in positions of power.  
9. How many friends I have depends on how nice a person I am.  
10. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.  
11. My life is chiefly controlled by powerful others.  
12. Whether or not I get into a car accident is mostly a matter of luck.  
13. People, like myself, have very little chance of protecting our personal interests 
when they conflict with those of strong pressure groups.  
14. It’s not always wise for me to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to 




15. Getting what I want requires pleasing those people above me.  
16. Whether or not I get to be a leader depends on whether I’m lucky enough to be in 
the right place at the right time.  
17. If important people were to decide they didn’t like me, I probably wouldn’t make 
many friends.  
18. I can pretty much determine what will happen in my life.  
19. I am usually able to protect my personal interests.  
20. Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on the other driver.  
21. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I worked hard for it.  
22. In order to have my plans work, I make sure that they fit in with the desires of 
people who have power over me.  
23. My life is determined by my own actions.  









Case Instructions. You will be presented with a case that is a civil lawsuit. In the case, 
the plaintiff is suing the defendant over a pedestrian-car accident that resulted in the 
unfortunate and gruesome death of the pedestrian. The pedestrian’s wife is suing the 
driver of the car for damages. These damages include the cost of the funeral as well as 
pain and suffering damages for the family of the man who died. The plaintiff and the 
defendant dispute who is at fault for the accident. Both sides have legitimate claims and 
we’re asking you to reach a decision about who should win this case. Please pay attention 
for the duration of this case as you will be asked to reach a decision about a situation that 
is very emotional and sensitive, and very important for both parties financially. 
Reaching this decision may not be easy because you will be asked to determine the 
percentage of liability that each party has and may need to decide what amount of 
money is the most accurate level of compensation based on graphic and upsetting 
evidence. Nevertheless, we ask that you consider all information and take the time to 
put yourself in the shoes of both parties but also to view this case as an unbiased 3rd 
party. When calculating liability and damages, it is okay to rely both on the facts 
presented and the emotions you feel for the parties in the case. We ask that you try your 







Jury Instructions. During this case, you will be exposed to some exhibits and witness 
statements. One exhibit is a photograph of the location where the man was struck with 
numerical information about how the accident occurred, and another is a graphic and 
vivid photograph of the man at the location where he was struck. You may find these 
pictures somewhat upsetting, but hopefully useful in determining the percentage of 
liability for both parties. In addition, you will hear testimony from a number of 
witnesses, which should provide you with accurate information about what happened but 
may also be graphic in nature and produce a strong emotional reaction in you. After 
you hear the evidence, you will be asked to mathematically calculate liability and any 









Overview. A fatal pedestrian-car accident occurred on 2nd Avenue, just south of Hill 
Street on 
Sunday, May 6, 2018, at approximately 5:22 p.m. This resulted in the tragic death of 
Kevin Hughes, who was the husband of the Plaintiff, Michelle Hughes. It was determined 
that he died from blood loss due to an accident with the defendant. The defendant hit 
Kevin Hughes as Kevin was walking across the street in the left lane of 2nd Avenue. This 
caused Kevin to lose a large quantity of blood and his consciousness. Ultimately, Kevin 
died at the scene of the accident.  Although Brian Healy was not driving too fast, the 
collision that involved Kevin Hughes’ head struck the hood, and being dragged 25 feet 
did enough harm to him that he was unconscious, life-less, and bled out on the road.  
Accident information. Defendant Brian Healy was driving West on Hill Street preparing 
to take a left turn onto 2nd Avenue in his 2013 Chevy Impala. Brian Healy had a green 
arrow and turned left onto 2nd Avenue. Brian Healy was traveling at a legal speed, 
approximately 25 MPH as he 
accelerated onto 2nd Avenue. Kevin Hughes was crossing 2nd Avenue from east to west. 
Kevin Hughes was not in the crosswalk, nor did the crosswalk say pedestrians could 
cross the street at that time. Kevin Hughes jaywalked about 30 feet south of the crosswalk 
across 2nd Avenue. Kevin Hughes was in the left lane of the southbound direction of 2nd 
Avenue. Brian Healy turned into the left lane (the first available legal lane) and soon after 




Kevin Hughes. Kevin Hughes’ head smashed into the hood of the car before he was 
thrown over to the passenger side of the vehicle. Brian Healy immediately slammed on 
the brakes to stop the vehicle. Kevin Hughes was dragged for approximately 25 feet on 
the pavement before the vehicle came to a complete stop. Once the vehicle stopped, 
Kevin Hughes’ body toppled from the hood of the car into the lane immediately to the 
right of the accident. Traffic stopped because of the accident and no other vehicles hit 
Kevin Hughes. A witness, Kevin Hughes’s friend, who was on the sidewalk ran out into 
the road and realized Kevin Hughes did not have a pulse and was severely injured. She 
yelled for someone to call 911. The woman gave CPR to Kevin Hughes while the 
ambulance was on its way. By the time paramedics arrived, Kevin Hughes had lost too 
much blood and he was pronounced dead. Although Brian Healy was not driving too fast, 
the collision that involved Kevin Hughes’ head hitting the hood of the car, and being 
dragged 25 feet did enough harm to him that he was unconscious and bled out on the 
road. 
Victim information. Michelle Hughes, the plaintiff in this case, was married to Kevin 
Hughes. Together they have two children who are both in high school. Michelle Hughes 
is suing Brian Healy for the cost of the funeral as well as pain and suffering damages. 
The funeral costs were $7,000. Michelle Hughes is asking for $200,000 for pain and 
suffering damages. Pain and suffering damages is the money awarded to plaintiffs for the 
problems they have faced that do not have a price with them (e.g., mental suffering, loss 
of enjoyment of life, loss of companionship, etc.). 
Accusation of negligence. The Plaintiff admits that Kevin Hughes was jaywalking, 




if they had the chance to stop or avoid the pedestrian but failed to do so. A driver is 
required to be alert to what is around them and to pay attention to hazards in the road. 
Consequently, drivers have a legal obligation to see and avoid what is there to be seen. 
The Plaintiff believes that Brian Healy was not paying attention to his 
surroundings and had the opportunity to stop or at least avoid hitting Kevin 
Hughes. Kevin Hughes was crossing the street about 30 feet south of the intersection, 
giving Brian Healy enough time to stop or at least avoid hitting Kevin Hughes. The 
accident occurred during daylight, so Brian Healy should have been able to 
see Kevin Hughes. 
Defendant’s Case 
 Brian Healy did not see Kevin Hughes until it was too late to stop, and therefore, 
should not be held responsible for this accident. Brian Healy did not do anything illegal – 
Kevin Hughes did. Kevin was not in the crosswalk nor did the crosswalk sign say 
pedestrians could cross at the time. The bright sun was in the sky to the west, behind the 
traffic light that Brian Healy was looking at before turning making it extremely difficult 
for him to see. Brian Healy was accelerating as he turned onto 2nd Avenue. It took Brian 
Healy a second to realize there was a person in the middle of the lane and that he needed 
to slam on the brakes. Brian Healy had to take his foot off the accelerator and slam on the 
brakes. The Highway Safety Code claims that it takes drivers at least .67 seconds to react 
to something and start braking. 0.67 seconds at 25 MPH is 25 feet. Therefore, the average 






Eyewitness Testimony Statements 
High Unrelated eyewitness testimony from the Plaintiff. “I saw it all happen as I was 
walking on the sidewalk towards the intersection. The driver hit my husband he hit his 
head on the hood hard. His body rolled off to the side of the car. He was dragged for a bit 
before the car finally stopped. He looked like he was hurt really badly, so I immediately 
ran out to him. When I got to my husband, he was unconscious and bleeding badly. I 
yelled for someone to call the police as I started doing CPR. The paramedics arrived a 
few minutes later and said there was nothing they could do. I couldn’t believe it because 
the car wasn’t going that fast. My husband was not paying attention because he was on 
his phone. I swear he thought he was invincible. I was so focused on my husband I 
wasn’t able to tell when the driver started to brake. But it seemed like he didn’t try to 
swerve to avoid hitting the pedestrian. Obviously, people should cross the road at a 
crosswalk and put their phones down, but it also seems like the driver could have been 
able to do something to avoid the accident if he was actually paying attention to where he 
was going.” 
Low Unrelated eyewitness testimony from the plaintiff. “I saw it all happen as I was 
walking on the sidewalk towards the intersection. The driver hit my husband he hit his 
head on the hood hard. His body rolled off to the side of the car. He was dragged for a bit 
before the car finally stopped. He looked like he was hurt really badly, so I immediately 
ran out to him. When I got to my husband, he was unconscious and bleeding badly. I 
yelled for someone to call the police as I started doing CPR. The paramedics arrived a 




the car wasn’t going that fast. My husband was not paying attention because he was on 
his phone. I was so focused on my husband I wasn’t able to tell when the driver started to 
brake. But it seemed like he didn’t try to swerve to avoid hitting the pedestrian. 
Obviously, people should cross the road at a crosswalk and put their phones down, but it 
also seems like the driver could have been able to do something to avoid the accident if 







Instructions. Consider the following statements and rate your agreement (1 = strongly 
disagree, 5 = strongly agree). 
Rationality Scale 
Rational Ability 
1. I’m not that good at figuring out complicated problems* 
2. I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis* 
3. I am not a very analytical thinker* 
4. Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points* 
5. I don’t reason well under pressure* 
6. I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people 
7. I have a logical mind 
8. I have no problem thinking things through carefully 
9. Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life 
10. I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions 
Rational Engagement 
11. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something* 
12. I enjoy intellectual challenges 
13. I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking* 
14. I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking 
15. Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity* 




17. Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction* 
18. I enjoy thinking in abstract terms 
19. Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is good 
enough for me* 
20. Learning new ways to think would be very appealing to me 
Experientiality Scale 
Experiential Ability 
21. I don’t have a very good sense of intuition* 
22. Using my gut feelings usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my 
life. 
23. I believe in trusting my hunches 
24. I trust my initial feelings about people 
25. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings 
26. If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes* 
27. I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings to find an answer 
28. My snap judgments are probably not as good as most people’s* 
29. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can’t explain how I 
know 
30. I suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they are accurate* 
Experiential Engagement 
31. I like to rely on my intuitive impressions 
32. Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems 




34. I don’t like situations in which I have to rely on intuition* 
35. I think there are times when one should rely on one’s intuition 
36. I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings* 
37. I don’t think it is a good idea to rely on one’s intuition for important decisions* 
38. I generally don’t depend on my feelings to help me make decisions* 
39. I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself as 
intuitive 
40. I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions 







Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients for Study Variables 
 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 
1. Rational 3.7 0.5 
    
2. Experiential 3.4 0.5 -0.062 
   
3. Powerful Others 2.7 0.6 -0.206* 0.001 
  
4. Chance 2.6 0.5 -0.278** 0.022 0.525** 
 
5. Internality 3.6 0.5 0.208* 0.099 -0.259** -0.227** 
**p < 0.01 (2-tailed); *p < .05 (2-tailed); N = 119 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
